Deleuze and Contemporary Planning Theory: Neither State nor Traditional Anarchism

Hojatollah Rahimi[a]*- Hassan Rahimi[b]

[a] Assistant Professor of Geography, Department of Geography, Yazd University, Yazd, Iran (Corresponding Author).

[b] M.A. of Geography and Urban Planning, Faculty of Earth Sciences, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, Iran.

ABSTRACT

Recently, urban planners have been interested to develop a new post-structural Deleuzian framework for planning theory. Generally, planning theory engages with Deleuze's philosophy from two different point of view. In one hand, planners such as Hillier, argue the Deleuzian planning theory with a step-by-step and State-led reformist view while planners such as Purcell, highlight the anarchistic dimension of Deleuze's philosophy and argue that the Deleuzian planning theory entirely rejects any State-led reformist planning and capitalism axioms. This article aims to argue that Hillier and Purcell, in general, have paid insufficient attention to the three key components (i.e. Knowledge, action, and desire) of Deleuze's philosophy. It has been argued that although Deleuze's philosophy provides multiple concepts and metaphors that enable planners to 'analyze' capitalism-based social relations, if planning theory is considered as a field that is necessarily related to action and is not confined to knowledge alone, then the concept of desire and the politics of desire must be considered the mainstay of a Deleuzian planning theory. Unlike Hillier's point of view, the Deleuzian concept of the "politics of desire" is never reformist and reactive, but revolutionary and active. In addition, unlike Purcell's anarchist point of view, the politics of desire does not aim to produce rationally stable subjects who seek to construct a rational order of community according to mutual aid and agreement. Rather, this kind of politics, by its creative nature, is directed at the deconstruction of social forms and order.

Keywords: Deleuze, Illusion, Knowledge, Action, The Politics of Desire.

* E_mail: rahimi.h@yazd.ac.ir

1. INTRODUCTION

Tendencies towards postmodernist/poststructuralist planning theory have increased since the 1970s. Charles Jencks, one of the pioneers of postmodernist planning theory, believes that modernist planning theory ended in 1972 when the Pruitt-Igoe housing estate in the United States was dynamited. This complex was considered as an example of modern planning and appreciated earlier (Taylor, 1998, p. 163). The demolition of this housing complex is a physical symbol representing the inability of rational planning to solve urban and regional problems. 1972 was the year that not only experienced the explosion of rational/modernist planning theory, but also observed the breaking of planning theory's strong chain of resistance to the acceptance of postmodernism/poststructuralism. According to Michael Dear, "postmodernism as method is basically a revolt against the rationality of modernism, a deliberate attack on the foundational character of much modernist thought… The position of postmodernism is that all major narratives are in doubt. […] Postmodernists claim that the relative privilege of one metanarrative over another one is ultimately undecidable" (Ibid, p. 164).

The work of philosophers such as Deleuze, Lacan, Derrida, Foucault, Baudrillard and Lyotard has been highly influential in poststructuralist planning theory (Albrecht & Lim, 1986; Allmendinger, 2002; Buser, 2014; Gunder & Hillier, 2016; Purcell, 2013). Although poststructural way of thinking is growing within the field of social sciences, if it is considered from the viewpoint of Thomas Kuhn's concept of paradigm shift, the diversity of engagements with it makes the idea of singular shift too simplified and problematic. Some fields of social sciences are more resistant to the poststructuralism, while the others are more related and compatible. Some fields like human geography, which are related to the description and explanation of socio-spatial relations, have more readily accepted poststructuralism than ones like urban planning which are normative and action-oriented (Doel, 1996; 1999; Elden & Crampton, 2016; McCormack, 2007; Wylie, 2006). The application of poststructuralism by normative fields such as urban planning encounters essential difficulties in terms of two dimensons: knowledge and theory of planning must be lead to action, and the nature of action in poststructuralism is vague and unclear. That is, there is no single view of the legitimacy or illegitimacy of reason, as well as the scope and purpose of actions in post-structuralism. As will be noted later, preferred action, according to some poststructuralists, is one that is irrational. On the other hand, knowledge, poststructuralism believes, is doubtful and illusive, and planners have right to question poststructuralism about how it is possible to justify the legacy of the action that is launched in terms of illusion and uncertainty.

Deleuzian planning is one of the poststructual/postmodern theories that has interpreted by urban planners in recent years (Banville & Torres, 2017; Hillier, 2008; 2011; 2013; Hillier & Cao, 2013; McGreevy, 2018; Purcell, 2013; Van Wezemael, 2008; Wood, 2009). Urban planners' encounter with Deleuze's philosophy can be categorized by locating their approach on the following continuum. On the right-hand side, there are planners like Jean Hillier, one of the pioneers of Deleuzian planning theory (De Roo & Hillier, 2016; Hillier, 2005; 2007; 2017; Hillier & Cao, 2013), who follow it with a pragmatic, reformist, and State-led view, whereas on the left-hand side, there are planners like Purcell, who argue that Deleuzian planning cannot be actualized within a capitalist, State-led planning framework by emphasizing the anarchistic dimension of Deleuze's philosophy. A Deleuzian planning, according to Purcell, 'would be planning that entirely refuses the state and capitalism' (Purcell, 2013, p. 33; 2016).

Although Deleuze's philosophy is susceptible of anarchism interpretation or of Statism interpretation, what makes Purcell and Hillier's interpretation insufficient is that they put less attention on the concept of 'knowledge', and the specific meaning of 'action' in Deleuze's philosophy. As we will see, their framework is, in contradiction with Deleuze, based on a rational model of action and knowledge. The present article argues that if Hillier and Purcell had paid attention to how Deleuze interpreted knowledge, they would not have interpreted Deleuze's philosophy either according to the pragmatic tradition (Hillier) or the traditional anarchist (Purcell), because both pragmatism and traditional anarchism believe in rational knowledge and rational action, while Deleuze denies the possibility of rational knowledge and rational action. In this article, the relationship between knowledge and action in Deleuze's philosophy is analyzed to evaluate Hillier and Purcell's views on the application of this philosophy in planning. In fact, this article seeks to give insight into Purcell's question of whether planning theory, whatever kind it might be, is prone to encounter 'Deleuze and Guattari's dangerous spirit' or rejects it by distorting the spirit of their philosophy attempts 'to find ways to make them more palatable to existing norms and structures' of capitalism (Purcell, 2013, p. 21).

2. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

To its end, the present article first examines the notion of knowledge in Deleuze's philosophy in the following section. It is argued that the concept of knowledge in Deleuze's philosophy should be interpreted and analyzed as a learning process through action. Accordingly, knowledge does not precede the action and the implementation of plans, it is achieved during the process of action and the

implementation of plans. Next, the meaning of action in Deleuze's philosophy is analyzed. The concept of action in Deleuze's philosophy is opposed to the concept of reaction. Based on Deleuze's views, in the present article, it is argued that desire, as the basis of society's movement and creativity, is an active force and should be considered the basis of any Deleuzian planning theory. Finally, Hillier and Purcell's interpretations of Deleuzian planning theory are discussed and examined based on the above three key concepts, i.e., knowledge, action, and desire, and it is shown that their interpretations of Deleuzian planning theory are insufficient due to their neglect of the abovementioned concepts, especially the concept of desire.

2.1. Deleuze and the Theory of Knowledge

Planners, in different steps of planning, including the definition of problems, the identification of alternative plans/ futures/ solutions, the evaluation of alternative plans/ futures/ solutions, the implementation of a selected plan/future/solution, and the monitoring of effects of selected plan/ future/ solution, have to engage with the theory of knowledge. In this section, it is attempted to examine the quality of a Deleuzian encounter with this process.

Identifying the problems is the first step of a planning process. Planning starts with the definition of the problems. Deleuze, following Henri Bergson, a French philosopher, reverses hierarchical relation between problem and solution. What is important for Deleuze is creating true problems instead of solving them. According to Deleuze, 'We are wrong to believe that the true and the false can only be brought to bear on solutions. This prejudice is social because society, and the language that transmits its order-words, set up ready-made problems, […], and force us to solve them' (Deleuze, 1988, p. 14). Not only solutions are always subject to falsity, but also it is true of stating problems. In other words, as knowledge is susceptible to provide false solutions, it is vulnerable to identify and propose false problems.

In addition to the nature of the problems, Deleuze considers the nature of solutions. 'A problem does not exist, apart from its solutions. […] A problem is determined at the same time as it is solved, but its determination is not the same as its solution' (Deleuze, 1994, p. 163) because 'an enacted solution to a problem will bring some aspects of the problem into clarity, and throw other aspects into obscurity' (Drummond & Themessl-Huber, 2007, p. 440). Problems, according to Deleuze, should be considered as 'opening up fields of discussion, in which there are many possible solutions' (May, 2005, p. 83). Therefore, the problem is independent of any specific solution because there is not any particular solution in relation to a specific problem.

In addition to mistakes, Deleuze, influenced by Kant and Bergson, raises other elements under the categories of illusion and stupidity in the discussions related to knowledge. For Deleuze, 'reason deep within itself engenders not mistakes but inevitable illusions' (Deleuze, 1988, p. 20). Deleuze states this against Descartes by following Kant and Bergson. According to Deleuze, Descartes assumes that reason in itself is a truth-oriented thing, and falsity is only the result of mistakes which are external to reason (Deleuze, 1994, p. 136; Roffe, 2014, pp. 76-77). By emphasizing the concept of illusion and following Kant and Bergson, Deleuze aims to internalize the relation between reason and falsity. Illusion, for him, 'is based in the deepest part of the intelligence'(Deleuze, 1988, p. 21). The enemies of reason, as Descartes held, are not outside the reason but, as Lyotard points it out, they are 'also within' it (Lyotard, 2013, p. 119). Illusion is inevitable and intelligence cannot eliminate it, but 'it can only be repressed' (Deleuze, 1988, p. 21). Stupidity has also its specific function in Deleuze's philosophy. Deleuze points it out that 'stupidity (not error) constitutes the greatest weakness of thought, but also the source of its highest power in that which forces it to think' (Deleuze, 1994, p. 275). Despite the above interpretations, Deleuze confesses that 'we are never referred to the real forces that form thought' (Deleuze, 1994, p. 103). Accordingly, our knowledge is not only contaminated by mistake, illusion, and stupidity, but also, we can never access to the reality of resources of falsity that constitute our knowledge and enforce us to think.

Planners seeks to expand their knowledge of the present to the future. Despite traditional planning's adherence to the linear concept of time according to which the present follows the past and moves into the future, for Deleuze, 'the past coexists with its own present'. The present does not follow the past, rather it 'is only the most contracted level of the past' (Deleuze, 1988, p. 74). Time is defined, according to Deleuze, in terms of coexistence instead of succession. The present, for him, 'divides at each instant into two directions, one oriented and dilated toward the past, the other contracted, contracting toward the future' (Deleuze, 1988, p. 52). Multiplicity, uncertainty, creativity, and openness constitute the most important characters of the future. In Deleuze' philosophy, the future is defined disregarding the predefined goal because the goals identified in the past does not correspond with the future. Repetition of the past in the present makes it different constantly (Deleuze, 1988, p. 61). Thus, planning, according to Deleuze, is not a logical process that gets us from A to B. Rather, 'we do not know in advance which way a line is going to turn' (Deleuze & Parnet, 1996, p. 137). Planner's situation with regard to this uncertain and complicated condition is like the situation of a player who throws a dice. Dice throwing constitutes two different moments of, first, 'the earth where the dice are thrown', and second, 'the sky where the dice fall back' (Deleuze, 2006, p. 25). The earth is the sign

of necessity and the sky is the represent of chance (Grosz, 2004, p. 140). It should be noted that dice numbers are not infinite, that is to say although it is not possible to predict which number will be rolled following any other number, the range of numbers is definite. 'Any dice throwing confirms a chance but dice numbers affirm the necessity of chance (Olkowski, 2017, p. 126).

In addition, the metaphor of dice throwing has an important implication for how planners encounter with the concept of causality in the process of planning. Planners are free as far as they throw a dice, i.e., as far as they develop and implement a plan, but they are determined as far as the outcomes of the plan is uncontrollable and unpredictable. Planners, with regard to the dice-throwing metaphor, are not wholly responsible for their decisions because of their inability to master the chance. Outcomes, whatever they might be, have to be affirmed instead of negated. Dice-throwing metaphor can be applied to understand different steps of planning. For example, it can be thought that the process of presenting different decisions and options is carried out by the will of the planners (decision-making) but it is the decision-making structure, power relations, and the conditions of political economy that determine which decision, and option, are selected as the preferred options in favor of which social groups, and geographical spaces. Every decision can be considered a number of the dice and then interpreted according to this metaphor. In addition, the implementation of the preferred option can be compared to the situation where the dice are thrown and the outcomes of the implementation can be considered the situation where the dice fall back.

Another key pillar in planning theory is to determine the goals of the plan. In fact, goal determination is the intertwined element of problem identification and definition. An event becomes a problem when it conflicts with specific goals and values. Therefore, the problem is always defined in relation to a specific goal or value. Knowledge, even if contaminated with illusion, mistake, and stupidity, cannot proceed without purpose. Knowledge is always oriented towards the understanding of something. Accordingly, planning seeks the achievement of a particular goal or destination. For example, the goal can be socio-spatial justice or the increase of economic efficiency. Regarding values and ethical goals of plans, Deleuze says: 'there is no Good or Evil, but there is good and bad' (Deleuze, 1988, p. 25).

Deleuze's ethical perspectivism is more relevant to an individualist society than to a collective society. He argues: "the good is what increases our will to power" (Deleuze, 1988, p. 25). For example, if we evaluate the distributive justice from the point view of Deleuze, taxation is bad when it decreases the power of wealthy people and is good when the distribution of tax burdens among poor people increases their will

to power. This way of argumentation leads planning theory into a relative view of ethics. Accordingly, distributive justice is neither good nor bad, but is good and bad.

Deleuze, in addition to his interest in Spinoza, is highly influenced by the moral philosophy of Nietzsche. His Nietzscheism places a double emphasis on relativism in ethics. While maintaining the basic elements of the moral philosophy of Spinoza, Nietzsche adds new views to it and makes it more radical. 'One of the main themes in Nietzsche's work is that Kant didn't progress a real critique because he can't pose the problem of critique in terms of values' (Deleuze, 2006, p. 1), and as a result, 'the whole critique was turned into the politics of compromise' (Deleuze, 2006, pp. 89-97). In On the Genealogy of Morality, Nietzsche, in contrast to Kant, argues that 'we need a critique of moral values, the value of these values themselves must first be called in question' (Nietzsche, 1989, p. 20). According to him, any attempt to conserve existing prevalent values can act as a constraint for new creations and the creativity of desire. He, in contrast to Kant, believes that a true critique is to destruct established values in favor of creating new values.

How can this attitude contribute to conventional planning theory, which must be value-based? Nietzsche and Deleuze argue that a true critique of values provides new spaces for new values, but they do not say how long new values are new, and should not be subjected to destroying critique. Does our social practical life allow planners to create an always-new spaces of values? Does destroying established values necessarily result in the emergence of new alternative values? Are planners free to actualize new spaces of values? For example, does the destruction of liberal values make planners able to freely create an alternative new space of the moral? There are thus no universal and absolute criteria in the Deleuzian moral philosophy according to which plans i.e., problems and their related solutions, can be evaluated. The only absolute moral criterion is the true critique of moral values, while planning, at least in its traditional sense, as an action-based theory, requires the choice of an option or a plan from different options and plans which are provided to decision-makers, based on specific moral values in the planning process. Deleuze's theory provides decision-makers with no single and absolute moral criterion for choosing the preferred alternatives, and merely presents a critique of all alternatives, each of which conforms to a particular moral value. According to this philosophy, there is no general and external criterion according to which a preferred plan can be selected from alternative plans. Thus, there is no possibility of doing a united collective action while the traditionally rational planning theory is necessarily concerned with public and collective action.

It seems that knowledge, according to Deleuze,

cannot improve action because not only as a result of external errors, but also there are errors or illusions in the intellect that make it impossible to know correctly. In addition, there is no absolute moral criteria according to which action can be conducted during a plan implementation. Does it mean that the traditional theory of knowledge has no place in a Deleuzian planning theory and we should replace it with an alternative theory, for instance, the theory of learning? Knowledge, as something that preceds action, a favorite assumption in traditional planning theory, has nothing to do with the philosophy of Deleuze. Thus, we should reverse the relation between knowledge and action within a Deleuzain planning theory. That is, knowledge should be considered an interrelated or even a posteriori element of action. As a result, knowledge is defined not as an abstract though and a priori but as a process of learning or apprenticeship through action. It is at this point, i.e., in the replacement of knowledge by apprenticeship, where the theory of action finds its place in Deleuzian planning and it is necessarily considered interrelated with action with no temporal or rational precedence. We discuss this issue in the next section of the article.

2.2. Deleuze and the Theory of Action

By evaluating Herbert Simon's approach to planning, Friedmann, an urban and regional theorist, argues that 'in Simon's theory, first of all, focusing on the issue of decision-making made knowledge a priority over action. Simon paid scant attention to the problem of implementation. So long as decisions were made rationally, […], it was assumed that the rest would take care of itself. Action, counteraction, and strategy were not part of Simon's vocabulary' (Friedmann, 1987, p. 152). We can reverse above evaluation with regards Deleuze, i.e., as far as it relates to his philosophy, action has primacy over abstract thought and this should be considered as a significant element of a Deleuzian planning theory.

Deleuze uses the example of new sports like surfing, windsurfing, hang-gliding to explain the weakness of abstract and static thought in order to encounter with practical contradictions of the outside world (Deleuze, 1995, p. 121): In order to ride the wave, a person must first know how to surf, but he must first enter into the wave. It is clear that static thought cannot resolve this contradiction. We can only learn surfing through action. Abstract thought not only cannot help us to learn surfing but prohibit the learning. In spite of traditional-rational planning theory according to which action is dependent of and subordinated to a prescribed plan, a Deleuzian planning rejects this linear and hierarchical relation of succession. Accordingly, it is necessarily an anti-formal-rational theory of planning. Deleuze asks planners, like anyone who wants to learn surfing, to advance the learning and knowledge process through and during action. Here, one can understand the influence of the philosophy

of pragmatism on Deleuze. As some interpreters of Deleuze, like Ferguson and Zamberlin, argue that pragmatism, extremely influenced by William James' philosophy, is one of the most influential philosophies on Deleuze' philosophy (Balducci et al., 2011, p. 487). For Deleuze, action and active forces 'escape consciousness and rationality. For this reason, it is 'more difficult' to give a clear description about action and activity (Deleuze, 2006, p. 41). Desire as a key concept for Deleuze is an essential active force in his philosophy. 'Where others focus upon language, structure, history, economic production, or power-relations as the foundation of human society and culture, Deleuze and Guattari simply choose desire' (Goodchild, 1996, p. 11) and consider it as the foundation of action and movement in society. The action and implementation of plans must be based on creativity and innovation, while the plan in conventional planning models, is executed after being prepared, and in accordance with the initial prepared plan. According to Deleuze's philosophy, the planning process is not the implementation of a pre-written plan, but the plan is written during creative action and execution. In other words, preparation and implementation of the plan are not two separate processes, meaning that the former does not followed by the latter, but as explained by the abovementioned example of learning surfing, the processes of plan preparation and plan implementation co-occur.

Desire, for Deleuze, 'is concerned with the driving force behind creation and relation' (Goodchild, 1996, p. 6). Desire is the foundation of creativity, and as an absolute revolutionary force, does not limit itself to any set of social codes (Wood, 2009, p. 203). Capitalism-based urban planning rules and regulations are some of the same social codes and rules. The creative action and creative implementation require to be not limited by sham and contractual rules of society, such as the capitalist urban rules and rights. An action limited by the contractual rules of society cannot be a creative action. However, Deleuze acknowledges that in the present situation, desire has been captured by the mechanisms of the capitalist system and encoded according to them. Deleuze and Guattari aim to provide strategies for releasing desire from the capitalist system.

State-led and rational plans, which are based on rational elitism, according to Deleuze, can be considered reactive forces that are imposed on biological bodies and social bodies (local communities), depriving the desire from its related arena of creativity and activity by capturing decision-making mechanisms. A Deleuzian planning thus is against capitalism, and State and social norms. It is not clear that we can remove the State as a reactive force from the landscape of our contemporary planning theory, leaving the whole area of creative activism to local communities and transferring the development and implementation processes of urban plans to local communities. To

remove this ambiguity, it is required to pay attention to Deleuze's view on the nature of community and social relations to understand what kind of social context is relevant to the Deleuzian concepts of active forces and creative actions. If we consider these concepts from Hobbes's perspective in Leviathan (Hobbes, 1997, p. 77), the necessity of urban order and security, especially in metropolises, does not allow us to extend the scope of active forces of local communities and individuals. To secure our living in contemporary urbanized society, we have to limit and subordinate active forces and creative participation of local communities in favor of the order because our condition, as Hobbes points it out, 'is a condition of war of every one against every one'(Hobbes, 1997, p. 80), and the state can only control the expansion of the war in such a large space as a metropolis. According to Hobbes, the State is 'a feigned or artificial person' against 'a natural person' (Hobbes, 1997, p. 98). Order, according to Hobbes, underlies security, and in large cities, security is prioritized over activism, and reactive forces, i.e., elitist planners and the State, are prioritized over active forces, local communities, and pluralistic planning. Thus, Deleuze's theory on creative and revolutionary action is incompatible with the capitalist system and State-led planning framework and cannot be pursued within this context. Due to the increasing social division of labor in the capitalist system and State-led planning framework, there is a distinction between the stages of preparation and implementation of plans, and the State, due to the need for order and security, is not willing to assign this process to the revolutionary creative forces who run away from the governing discipline.

Purcel argues that 'in many ways' a Deleuzian philosophy is 'closer to the traditional anarchism'. According to him, Deleuze and Guattari seek to propose a form of action according to 'a mutual augmentation through connection' (Purcell, 2013, p. 27). There are some concepts within Deleuzian philosophy such as rhizome, line of flight and self-organization that can be interpreted from the point of view of traditional anarchism. For example, in Deleuze's philosophy, the idea of rhizome refers to decentralized non-hierarchical society that can be used in participatory planning models. However, there are some other key concepts, especially the concept of desire, that do not permit us to confiscate Deleuze's concepts of rhizome, line of flight and self-organization in favor of traditional anarchism. Although these concepts 'are headlong escapes toward a world beyond the state and capitalism', they do not direct us to traditional anarchism. As far as it is related to Deleuze's philosophy, all concepts are articulated around the politics of desire. As many interpreters of Deleuze's philosophy believe, 'The politics of desire is the sole purpose of Deleuze and Guattari's thought' (Goodchild, 1996, p. 5; Patton, 2002, p. 68). Deleuze and Guattari 'maintain that

desire is not the result of the social field and social codes. Rather, social codes are the product of desire' (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004, p. 29). According to May, they, despite of traditional anarchism, dismiss a belief in the essentially benign nature of human being (May, 1994, p. 75). Unlike traditional anarchism, 'desireis not by nature directed at the production of stable subjects whose own conscious desires respect the familial and social order' (Patton, 2002, pp. 70), but it 'is potentially capable of demolishing the social form' (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004, p. 116). A Deleuzian planning thus does not seek to create anarchistic communities with sustainable cooperation and mutual agreement.

Rationality, for Deleuze, belongs to the philosophy of State and acts in line with its interests (Newman, 2001, p. 7). A rational-elitist planning framework as 'the unity of all the faculties at the center constituted by the Cogito' is, for Deleuze and Guattari, 'the State consensus raised to the absolute' (Deleuze & Guattari, 1988, p. 376). If the State is to be demolished, new models of politics must be devised that does not let themselves be captured by rationality. 'For Deleuze […] a philosophy like anarchism, which posits a critique of State authority based on moral and rational principles, would reaffirm State power' (Newman, 2001, p. 9). Creative action refers to an action that is not oppressed by rational frameworks of the State or traditional anarchism. Therefore, it is difficult, as we argued above and according to scholars such as Patton, May and Newman, to confiscate Deleuze's philosophy in favor of traditional anarchism or rational Statism. Deleuze's philosophy is even closer to anti-humanism than anarchism or Statism; an anti-humanism 'whose origins Deleuze rightly locates in Nietzsche's thinking' and ironically 'does constitute an emancipatory project' (Call, 2002, p. 38).

3. CONCLUSION

So far, planners have provided two different interpretations of the quality of a Deleuzian theory of planning. One of these two interpretations (Hillier's interpretation) attempts to position it within a pragmatic and reformist approach, arguing that Deleuze's philosophy can be used in the context of capitalist social relations. The second strand (Purcell's interpretation) tries to read Deleuze's philosophy from the perspective of traditional anarchism, arguing that Deleuze's philosophy cannot be applied within the context of capitalism and State-led planning. The drawback to these interpretations is that they examine Deleuze's philosophy merely based on a specific definition of knowledge and action, i.e., rational knowledge and rational action, regardless of Deleuze's theory of knowledge and the specific concept of action in Deleuze's theory. By analyzing some of the Deleuzian concepts related to the issue of knowledge and action, the present article indicated that, contrary

to the former interpretation of Deleuze's philosophy (i.e., Hillier's interpretation), rational elitism and State-led planning are not confirmed by Deleuze's philosophy. Contrary to the latter interpretation (i.e., Purcell's interpretation), Deleuze's philosophy also does not seek to create a society based on mutual reinforcement according to the views of traditional anarchism.

If the theory of planning is considered a theory necessarily related to action and is not confined to knowledge alone, then the concept of desire and the politics of desire must be considered the mainstay of the theory of Deleuzian planning. The politics of desire, as noted, is the main purpose of Deleuze and Guattari's philosophy, and contrary to Hillier, this politics is never reformist, but, as Deleuze points out, "Desire is revolutionary. This does not mean that desire wants a revolution. The situation is even better, the desire is intrinsically revolutionary because it produces all kinds of desire machines that are able to prevent the continuation of something, when they enter the social arena, and thus, capture the position of the fundamental social structure" (Deleuze, 2004, p. 233). Deleuze uses a similar description for philosophy and, in fact, equates the activity of philosophy with the activity of desire. In his view, "philosophy, in itself, is creative or even revolutionary, because it is always creating new concepts" (Deleuze, 1995, p. 136). On the other hand, the politics of desire, contrary to anarchist politics, does not orient itself towards the production of stable social subjects that recognize social and family orders. Rather, "the production of desire — a real desire — potentially leads to the complete destruction of the social form" (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004, p. 116) and therefore, it cannot orient itself towards the creation of stable societies based on stable interaction and cooperation mentioned in Purcell's view. The politics of desire is the starting point of any Deleuzian planning theory, and other Deleuzian concepts are formulated based on it. Therefore, it should be noted that rational planning could not claim to create and produce spaces of desire because, as Deleuze points out, the politics of desire fundamentally avoids rationality and consciousness. As a result, rational planning, whether in its anarchist form (Purcell) or in its pragmatic and reformist form (Hillier), can only distort the politics of desire and Deleuze's philosophy. Perhaps, now one can answer the question raised by Purcell about Deleuze's philosophy and the theory of planning, as presented in the "introduction" section, as follows: Deleuze and Guattari's philosophy has no relevance to the rational-pragmatic and rational-anarchist planning theories, because the three key concepts in Deleuze's philosophy, namely knowledge, action, and desire, are not congruent with rational projects. Nevertheless, Deleuze's philosophy contains a useful set of concepts that can be used by geographers and planners to describe and analyze contemporary capitalist society. However, using these concepts in analyses does not mean to have a Deleuzian planning theory in action.

Rahimi, H. et al.

REFERENCES

– Albrecht, J., & Lim, G. C. (1986). A search for alternative planning theory: Use of critical theory. *Journal of Architectural and Planning Research*, 117-131. https://www.jstor.org/stable/43028795?refreqid=excelsior%3A3e8f-b8a36e54f652c40af1660108afdc

– Allmendinger, P. (2002). Towards a post-positivist typology of planning theory. *Planning theory,* 1(1), 77-99. https://doi.org/10.1177/147309520200100105

– Balducci, A., Boelens, L., Hillier, J., Nyseth, T., & Wilkinson, C. (2011). Introduction: Strategic spatial planning in uncertainty: theory and exploratory practice. *Town Planning Review*, 82(5), 481-501. https://www.jstor.org/stable/41300330

– Banville, M. S., & Torres, J. (2017). On embracing an immanent ethics in urban planning: Pursuing our Body-without-Organs. *Planning Theory*, 16(3), 255-274. https://doi.org/10.1177/1473095215625707

– Buser, M. (2014). Thinking through non-representational and affective atmospheres in planning theory and practice. *Planning Theory*, 13(3), 227-243. http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?-doi=10.1.1.865.7169&rep=rep1&type=pdf

– Call, L. (2002). *Postmodern anarchism*: Lexington Books.

– De Roo, G., & Hillier, J. (2016). Complexity and spatial planning: introducing systems, assemblages and simulations *Complexity and Planning* (pp. 19-52): Routledge.

– Deleuze, G. (1988). *Bergsonism*: MIT Press.

– Deleuze, G. (1988). *Spinoza: practical philosophy*: City Lights Books.

– Deleuze, G. (1994). *Difference and repetition*: Columbia University Press.

– Deleuze, G. (1995). *Negotiations, 1972-1990:* Columbia University Press.

– Deleuze, G. (2006). *Nietzsche and philosophy:* Columbia University Press.

– Deleuze, G., & Guattari, F. (1988). *A thousand plateaus: Capitalism and schizophrenia*: Bloomsbury Publishing.

– Deleuze, G., & Guattari, F. Ì. (2004). *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (R. Hurley, Trans.): Bloomsbury Academic.

– Deleuze, G. (2004). *Desert islands and other texts 1953–1974*. (M. Taormina, Trans.): Los Angeles, CA: Semitext(e).

– Deleuze, G., & Parnet, C. (1996). Dialogues.

– Doel, M. A. (1996). A hundred thousand lines of flight: a machinic introduction to the nomad thought and scrumpled geography of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. *Environment and planning D: society and space*, 14(4), 421-439. https://doi.org/10.1068/d140421

– Doel, M. A. (1999). *Poststructuralist geographies: the diabolical art of spatial science*: Rowman & Littlefield.

– Drummond, J. S., & Themessl-Huber, M. (2007). The cyclical process of action research: The contribution of Gilles Deleuze. *Action Research*, 5(4), 430-448. http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?-doi=10.1.1.834.7840&rep=rep1&type=pdf

– Elden, S., & Crampton, J. W. (2016). Introduction Space, knowledge and power: Foucault and geography Space, *Knowledge and Power* (pp. 13-28): Routledge. https://www.academia.edu/download/31144419/Foucault_and_geography.pdf#page=14

– Friedmann, J. (1987). *Planning in the public domain: From knowledge to action*: Princeton University Press.

– Goodchild, P. (1996). *Deleuze and Guattari: An introduction to the politics of desire* (Vol. 44): Sage.

– Grosz, E. (2004). *The nick of time: Politics, evolution, and the untimely*: Duke University Press.

– Gunder, M., & Hillier, J. (2016). *Planning in ten words or less: A Lacanian entanglement with spatial planning:* Routledge.

– Hillier, J. (2005). Straddling the post-structuralist abyss: between transcendence and immanence? *Planning Theory*, 4(3), 271-299. https://www-personal.umich.edu/~sdcamp/temp/readers08web/Hillier%20(2005),%20Post-Structuralist%20Abyss%20(Planning%20Theory).pdf

– Hillier, J. (2007). *Stretching beyond the horizon: a multiplanar theory of spatial planning and governance*: Routledge.

– Hillier, J. (2008). Plan (e) speaking: A multiplanar theory of spatial planning. *Planning Theory*, 7(1), 24-50. http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.1004.6105&rep=rep1&type=pdf

– Hillier, J. (2011). Encountering Gilles Deleuze in another place. *European Planning Studies*, 19(5), 861-885. https://doi.org/10.1080/09654313.2011.561041

– Hillier, J. (2013). On relationality and uncertainty. *disP-The Planning Review*, 49(3), 32-39. https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Jean-Hillier/publication/275180770_On_Relationality_and_Uncertainty/links/6004db-

6792851c13fe1bd91b/On-Relationality-and-Uncertainty.pdf

– Hillier, J. (2017). On Planning for Not Having a Plan? *Planning Theory & Practice*, 18(4), 668-675. https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Jean-Hillier/publication/320392369_On_Planning_for_Not_Having_a_Plan/links/5f5f3d254585154dbbd02e45/On-Planning-for-Not-Having-a-Plan.pdf

– Hillier, J., & Cao, K. (2013). Deleuzian dragons: Thinking Chinese strategic spatial planning with Gilles Deleuze. *Deleuze Studies*, 7(3), 390-405. https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Jean-Hillier/publication/272765032_Deleuzian_Dragons_Thinking_Chinese_Strategic_Spatial_Planning_with_Gilles_Deleuze/links/5df-c62654585159aa48a52fd/Deleuzian-Dragons-Thinking-Chinese-Strategic-Spatial-Planning-with-Gilles-Deleuze.pdf

– Hobbes, T. (1997). *Leviathan*: Dover Publications.

– Lyotard, J. F. (2013). *Why philosophize?* : Polity.

– May, T. (1994). *The political philosophy of poststructuralist anarchism*: Penn State Press.

– May, T. (2005). *Gilles Deleuze: an introduction*: Cambridge University Press.

– McCormack, D. P. (2007). Molecular affects in human geographies. *Environment and Planning A*, 39(2), 359-377. https://doi.org/10.1068/a3889

– McGreevy, M. P. (2018). Complexity as the telos of postmodern planning and design: Designing better cities from the bottom-up. *Planning Theory*, 17(3), 355-374. https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Michael-Mcgreevy/publication/317788345_Complexity_as_the_telos_of_postmodern_planning_and_design_Designing_better_cities_from_the_bottom-up/links/5f03c7eba6fdcc4ca452d4c1/Complexity-as-the-telos-of-postmodern-planning-and-design-Designing-better-cities-from-the-bottom-up.pdf

– Newman, S. (2001). War on the state: Stirner and Deleuze's anarchism. *Anarchist Studies*, 9(2), 147-164. https://funambule.org/lectures/anarchisme/Saul_Newman__War_on_the_State__Stirner_and_Deleuze_s_Anarchism_a4.pdf

– Nietzsche, F. (1989). On the Genealogy of Morals. On the Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo. Trans. Walter Kaufmann and RJ Hollingdale. *New York: Vintage*, 13-163.

– Olkowski, D. (2017). Nietzsche's dice throw: Tragedy, nihilism, and the body without organs *Gilles Deleuze and the theater of philosophy* (pp. 119-140): Routledge.

– Patton, P. (2002). *Deleuze and the Political*: Routledge.

– Purcell, M. (2013). A new land: Deleuze and Guattari and planning. *Planning Theory & Practice*, 14(1), 20-38. https://doi.org/10.1080/14649357.2012.761279

– Purcell, M. (2016). For democracy: Planning and publics without the state. *Planning Theory*, 15(4), 386-401. http://faculty.washington.edu/mpurcell/non_state_publics.pdf

– Roffe, J. (2014). Error, Illusion, Deception: Deleuze against James *Deleuze and Pragmatism* (pp. 89-104): Routledge.

– Taylor, N. (1998). *Urban planning theory since 1945*: Sage.

– Van Wezemael, J. (2008). The contribution of assemblage theory and minor politics for democratic network governance. *Planning Theory*, 7(2), 165-185. https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Joris-Van-Wezemael/publication/249743072_The_Contribution_of_Assemblage_Theory_and_Minor_Politics_for_Democratic_Network_Governance/links/58bddf74aca27261e52e9766/The-Contribution-of-Assemblage-Theory-and-Minor-Politics-for-Democratic-Network-Governance.pdf

– Wood, S. (2009). Desiring docklands: Deleuze and urban planning discourse. *Planning Theory*, 8(2), 191-216. http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.1027.9836&rep=rep1&type=pdf

– Wylie, J. (2006). Depths and folds: on landscape and the gazing subject. *Environment and planning d: society and space*, 24(4), 519-535. https://doi.org/10.1068/d380t

HOW TO CITE THIS ARTICLE

COPYRIGHTS