Passive Defense Criteria in Designing of Public Urban Buildings

Document Type : Original Article

Authors

1 Assistant Professor of Architecture, Faculty of Architecture and Urban Planning, University of Art, Tehran, Iran.

2 M.A. of Architecture, Faculty of Engineering, Qom Islamic Azad University, Qom, Iran and Member of Young Researchers and Elite Club.

Abstract

Political and military considerations are among the important factors affecting the formation of any human habitat in history while the spread of evil war is so extensive that no habitat on the planet earth is immune from it. Therefore, the current peace does not equal to its continuity and the importance of maintenance and improvement of defensive preparation in all dimensions, called the passive defense, is a continual, developable and very obvious process. One of the important aspects of civil design and development is the emphasis on the quality and quantity of city vulnerability against the harms caused by the military attacks. In order to decrease the cities' vulnerability against the war harms the process to develop and enforce the plans of passive defense is strictly necessary. With the descriptive analytical method and the reliance on gathering information in the library internet method and also the field researches, this article attempts to recognize the harms and threats on the city collective buildings after achieving the technical criteria, through:
• Utilizing Them in the Phase of Architecture Design;
• Investigating the Security Level of Citizen Increases in the Probable Situations of Modern Wars (So Called Sixth Generation Fights);
• Consequently the Improvement of Defensive Power and the National Security against
the Growing Threats of the Periphery.
The results of the research indicate that the architecture of public buildings should consider some special criteria to maintain its resistance and life and continuation of activities in crisis situations. The presented criteria to reform and design the public buildings are based on the following features:
1. The criteria are proportional to the characteristics of modern wars.
2. They reach from large scale (urban cells) to small scale (single buildings).
3. They are presented based on the separation of selected uses.
4. They insist on the reform and architecture design of public (selected) buildings.
5. They focus on the supply of the most important and vital needs of the crisis time.
6. They notice to the organization, best use of facilities, installations, spaces and buildings in emergency situations.
In the scale of collective buildings, the following recommendations and principles are presented based on the separation of uses:
The principles of passive defense in educational buildings:
• Schools
􀀋 Absence of Sensitive and Vital Centers till the 1000 Meters Ray
􀀋 Having Secure Rooms in all of the Stories
􀀋 Maximum Stories in Primary School Two Ones, in Guidance School Three Ones and in High School Four Ones
􀀋 Fast and Easy Access to Obvious Exits
􀀋 Accessibility to Vital Services such as Firefighting in Maximum 3 Minutes
• Universities
􀀋 Having Firm Shelters and Warehouses Beneath the Open and Green Spaces of Universities
􀀋 Having a Network of Secure Subsurface Accesses among the Aforementioned Shelters
􀀋 Radius of Access to the Subsurface Space of Universities in Maximum 500 Meters
􀀋 Possibility of Full Discharge of Population in Maximum 3 Minutes
The Principles of Passive Defense in Commercial Buildings:
• Having Multi-purpose Spaces
• Settling the Warehouses in Secure or Separable Places and with the Space From the Users Paths
• Having the Roadway and Sidewalk Paths Separately beside the Building
• Having the Automatic Systems of Fireproofing
• Having the Warning Systems with Full Acoustic Covering
The Principles of Passive Defense in Medicinal Buildings:
• Fabrication of Safe Warehouses Specific to Storing the Medicine and Emergency Facilities
• Easy Access to the Main City Roads
• Possibility of Fast and Easy Traffic of Relief Vehicles in the Hospitals
• Having Light and Heavy Transport Parking
• Having the Place of Helicopter Landing
• Visibility of Entrance
The Principles of Passive Defense in Metro:
• Maximum admissible radius of access to metro station is 500 meters.
• Emergency exits with depth of more than the depth of the gathering place of refugees
• Adequate width and the security of tunnels for the passing of people
• Having multiple ventilation channels in order to confront the fuel-air bombs
• Emergency self-sufficiency of ventilation systems of the network and the electricity of the trains and the lightning of the tunnels
• Having Emergency and independent communication and telecommunication to contact with the outside environment
• The principles of passive defense in Passenger terminal (airports, railway stations and the intercity bus terminals):
• Separation of Sensitive Places from Insensitive Ones (such as Runways, Watch Tower, Airplane Parking, Trains or Buses, Fuel Tanks)
• Camouflaging the Outdoor Area of Passenger Terminals with the Dense Vegetation Cover and also the Terrain
• Having Multiple and very Wide Essential Exits without the Step or Inconsistent Surface
• Legibility of the Paths, Entrances and Exits and the Creation of Multiple Emergency Exits in the Stories
• Having Subway Public Parking

Keywords


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